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ABSTRACT
In August 2006, NASA awarded Space Act Agreements
(SAAB) for Commercial Orbital Transportation Services
(COTS) Linder the Commercial Crew and Cargo Project
Office at Johnson Space Center. One of the goals of the
SAAs is to facilitate U.S. private industry demonstration
of cargo transportation capabilities ; ultimately achieving
reliable, cost effective access to Low-Earth Orbit
(LEO).
Each COTS provider is required to complete
International Space Station (ISS) Integration activities,
which includes meeting the physical and functional
interfaces, safety and mission assurance requirements,
and other interface requirements between the ISS and
COTS vehicles. These requirements focus on the areas
of risk to the ISS during rendezvous and proximity
operations, as well as the integration operations while
the COTS vehicle is berthed to the ISS.
On December 23, 2008, NASA awarded Commercial
Resupply Service (CRS) contracts to provide resupply
services to the ISS following the Shuttle retirement. In
addition to performing any ISS Integration activities,
NASA will be performing independent assessments of
the launch vehicle and orbital vehicle to evaluate the
readiness of the contractor to deliver NASA cargo
safely to the ISS.
This paper will address the activities of NASA Centers,
JSC and KSC, in the oversight and insight function over
commercial visiting vehicles to the ISS.
1. BACKGROUND
The International Space Station is the collaborative
effort of numerous countries for the purpose of
maintaining a long term human presence in space and
creating an outpost for microgravity experimentation
[1]. The STS-131 nvssion recently delivered laboratory
facilities to the ISS, which included the Window
Observational Research Facility (WORF). The WORF
will utilize the optical-quality window in the Destiny
Laboratory [2). The STS-132 mission this month will
deliver the 2" of two Russian Mini-Research Modules
[31
Figure 1. ISSphotographed by an STS-130 crew
member on Space Shuttle Endeavour- after the ISS and
Shuttle began thew post-undoeking relative separation.
Resupply of cargo to the ISS is essential in order to
maintain Earth orbiting international laboratory.
NASA projected a shortfall in the resupply capabilities
in excess of 6 tons before the planned Shuttle retirement
in 2010- Using the existing resupply services offered by
the Russian Progress vehicles, the European Automated
Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and Japanese H-II Transfer
Vehicle (HTV), the shortfall would continue to grow in
excess of 60 tons by ISS retirement [4].
Figure 2. NASA COTS Capabilit y Concept
International Space Station Program
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1.1 Commercial Orbital Transportation Services
(COTS)
As a result of the forecasted resupply shortfall to ISS ; a
new market emerged for cargo delivery to and cargo
return from the ISS especially following Shuttle
retirement. The Commercial Crew and Cargo Project
Office (C3PO) at NASA Johnson Space Center was
formed and chartered with the responsibility to establish
commercial capabilities and services to Low Earth Orbit
(LEO), with a goal to support the resupply needs of the
ISS [5].
In January 2006, Conunercial Orbital Transportation
Service Demonstrations Announcement Number COTS-
01-0.5 was released. NASA committed approximately
$500M to support commercial space vehicle
development over the time period from 2006 to 2010-
In August 2006, NASA awarded two funded Space Act
Agreements (SAA). One award was to Space
Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) and the second
award to Rocketplane-Kistler (RpK).
Figure 3. SpaceX Dragon
However, the RpK agreement with NASA was later
terminated and a second Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services Phase 1 Demonstrations,
Announcement Number JSC-COTS-2, was released in
October 2007- A funded SAA agreement was awarded
to Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital) in February
2008-
Under the funded SAA agreements, the partners are
responsible for their design, development,
manufacturing, testing and operations of their systems.
Each partner must meet vehicle interface and ISS
integration requirements and demonstrate a mission to
the ISS. The mission to ISS is contingent upon the
partner meeting the ISS visiting vehicle requirements
dubbed "ISS Integration", which include safety and
mission assurance requirements.
Figure 4. Orbital's Cygnus
NASA's primary role is to monitor the progress of the
partners against the agreed to milestones. NASA
provides technical assistance in support of the partners
versus the traditional technical NASA oversight
function. The ISS Pro gram works with C3PO and each
partner in ISS Integration activities [5].
1.2 ISS Commercial Resupply Services (CRS)
In August 2007, NASA began laying the ground work
with industry for the competitive procurement of cargo
services to ISS with the release of a Request for
Information (RFI). NASA utilized the feedback
received from this phase of the procurement in the
development of the Request for Proposal (RFP). The
Final RFP was released on April 14, 2008 [6].
The procurement strategy was similar to that of the
funded SAA for the demonstration missions. NASA
was to procure an end-to-end resupply service to meet
annual resupply requirements for calendar years 2010
through 2015, instead of the traditional procurement of
a vehicle. The contractor would be responsible to
perform all tasks necessary to execute the resupply
mission to the ISS, including any necessary services,
testing of hardware and software, and any mission
specific elements requirement to integrate the cargo to
their vehicle [7].
On December 23, 2008, NASA awarded two CRS
contracts. One award was to SpaceX for pressurized
and unpressurized upmass capability, as well as the
capability for cargo return. The second award went to
Orbital for pressurized upmass capability, as well as
disposal [6].
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Figure 5. Russian Progress, European ATV, Japanese
HTV and domestically developed commercial vehicles
(average mission comparison — not maximum vehicle
capabilities)[6]
SpaceX was awarded 12 flights over the time period of
2011 through 2015. The Dragon vehicle has a
pressurized compartment, which is recoverable, and can
hold up to 10m3 of cargo. The pressurized
compartment can accommodate bagged cargo, middeck
lockers, and has other mounting capabilities, upon
request.	 The unpressurized trunk, which is
unrecoverable, can hold up to 14m3 of cargo and
accommodates	 Flight	 Releasable	 Attachment
Mechanisms (FRAM) type pallet interfaces [8].
Figure 6. Dragon Spacecraft in Cargo Configuration
[8]
Orbital was awarded eight flights across the same time
period. 2011 through 2015. Orbital's Cygnus is a
pressurized volume which can hold up to 18.9m'cargo
volume. Cygnus can accommodate passive cargo; such
as bags and middeck lockers, active middeck lockers,
and can be used to dispose cargo reloaded on Cygnus
prior to unberthing [9].
Figure 7. Cygnus[10]
2 ISS INTEGRATION
ISS Integration requirements paved the way for a
paradigm change for the ISS Program from procuring a
vehicle to procuring a service. NASA defined the
critical interface for insight and approval to be at the
ISS interface. The ISS Integration requirements focus
on the areas of risk to the ISS during rendezvous and
proximity operations, as well as the integration
operations while the COTS vehicle is berthed to the
ISS. ISS Integration requirements provide the interface
and performance requirements between the ISS and
COTS vehicle, the performance and design
requirements for the COTS ground systems supporting
COTS vehicle flights to ISS, and the design
requirements on the COTS vehicle to ensure safe
integration with ISS.
Prior to a demonstration mission to the ISS, the COTS
partner must verify the requirements for ISS Integration
have been met by means, such as analysis; test,
inspection or a combination thereof. Each partner shall
provide certification that their orbital vehicle can safely
berth/unberth to/from the ISS and integrated operations
following berthing to the ISS can be performed safely.
2.1 Scope of the ISS Visiting Vehicle Requirements
As previously mentioned, the scope of the ISS
Integration requirements is at the interface. Each COTS
vehicle will be captured by the Space Station Remote
Manipulator System (SSRMS) and be berthed to the ISS
at a Common Berthing Mechanism (CBM) interface at
the Node 2 nadir port.
To ensure a safe integration with ISS; the interface must
be defined beyond just the true physical interface
between the vehicles. The virtual interface must extend
to cover a period of approach of the COTS vehicles to
the ISS to protect the ISS vehicle from a collision
hazard. Integrated operations start at 90 minutes prior
to approach initiation (AI) of the orbital vehicle and
lasts until the vehicle leaves the approach ellipsoid (AE)
on a non-return trajectory.
The requirements levied on the commercial partners are
consistent with the requirements levied on our
International partners.
2.2 Safety Requirements and Process
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Figure 8. Approach Ellipsoid and Keep-Ort Sphere
The approach ellipsoid is defined as the 4 x 2 x 2 km
ellipsoid, centered at the ISS center of mass, with the
long axis aligned with the V-Bar. The approach
initiation is the first maneuver which will bring the
orbital vehicle into the AE. The Keep Out Sphere
(KOS) is defined as a 200m radius, centered at the ISS
center of mass.
There are many requirements within the ISS Integration
document that reduce the overall risk to ISS and its
crew during Integrated Operations. As an example,
during the approach phase to the ISS, decision points
will be used to assess the performance of the orbital
vehicle to ensure the vehicle will meet the nominal
mission objectives without causing damage to or
creating potential hazards for the ISS and its crew.
There will be at least one decision point during the
Integrated Operations while the vehicle is outside of the
A.E. The vehicle will hold and not continue on the
nominal approach until authorization has been received
from NASA Mission Control — Houston (MCC-H).
Once inside the AE, there will be at least one decision
point prior to the vehicle continuing with the nominal
approach and enter the KOS. A gain, the vehicle will
hold at the decision point location and await
authorization from MCC-H before entering the KOS.
The ISS Integration requirements cover subject areas
on:
1. ISS Cargo Accommodations
2. ISS Crew Accommodations
3. ISS rendezvous and Proxinuty Operations
4. Vestibule Pressurization/Depressurization
5. Micro-gravity
6. Command and Data Handling
7. Communication, Command, and Control
8. EVA and Robotics
9. On-Orbital Environmental Conditions
10. Safety and Mission Assurance
ISS Program safety requirements were derived from
existing Shuttle safety policy and requirements. Shuttle
safety requirements utilize a proven approach to the
control philosophy for catastrophic and critical hazards,
as well as a design for nunimum risk approach for such
items as windows and structure.
In the development of ISS Integration requirements, the
safety requirements were derived from ISS Program
safety requirements. The safety requirements
documented in the applicable IRDs for other visiting
vehicles to ISS, such as ATV and HTV, were also
derived from ISS Pro gram safety requirements.
In addition, any visiting vehicle to the ISS must comply
with the phased ISS Program safety review process. As
levied upon the COTS,%'CRS partners in order to meet
ISS Integration requirements, the COTS/CRS partners
must adhere to ISS Safety Review process and perform
all safety analyses in accordance with the ISS Program
safety analysis and risk assessment process. The ISS
Safety Review Panel will review and approve the hazard
analysis, which addresses all ISS-related mission
phases. All potential hazards are to be identified and
controlled in accordance with standard ISS safety
requirements.
The integrated safety of the ISS is not compromised by
the commercial ventures. Each commercial partner
must meet the same stringent safety requirements and
follow the same well established safet y review
processes as all other visiting vehicles to the ISS.
2.3 Certification of Flight Readiness (CoFR)
For Shuttle missions to ISS, NASA performs
Certification of Flight Readiness (CoFR) reviews to
certify the Shuttle and the ISS are ready for the flight.
These reviews culminate with a Flight Readiness
Review (FRR) Board conducting an assessment of the
Shuttle Program readiness of all flight and ground
systems and supporting personnel. In support of the
FRR Board, the ISS program conducts a comprehensive
readiness assessment of the Launch Package/Cargo
Element (LP/CE), ground hardware/software support
facilities and personnel to support the flight, stage and
increment during the readiness of the on-orbit stage to
accept the LP/CE and return items. Upon concurrence
from the FRR Board and completion of planned open
work, the Space Shuttle Program attests they are ready
to execute the Shuttle mission. The ISS Program attests
they are ready for launch and on-orbit operations for all
Shuttle-ISS missions [11].
Government Mandatory Inspection Points (GMIPs).
There are no GMIPs imposed on the COTS/CRS
agreements/contracts.
COTS and CRS launches are commercial launches and
will be certified by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA). In addition; range safety is the responsibility of
the range from which these commercial vehicles are
utilizing. The CoFR process for COTS and CRS
mission to ISS will, therefore, not include a "go" or
"no/go" for launch as the FRR Board concludes for
Shuttle missions to ISS. However, the ISS Program will
continue to assess the readiness of the cargo on these
missions and the readiness of the ISS to support the
flight, stage and increment, as described above. In
addition; the ISS Program will assure that all the
requirements for ISS Integration have been satisfied,
ensuring safe integrated operations of the COTS/CRS
vehicles with the ISS.
3 WHAT IS NEW UNDER CRS
Under the COTS demonstration missions to the ISS,
demonstration cargo may be used to demonstrate the
commercial partner's ability to execute the cargo
missions. The risk to the ISS Program is during the
Integrated Operations of the commercial partner's
vehicle with the ISS and that risk is mitigated by the
partner's vehicles and operations meeting the ISS
Integration requirements.
However, cargo flown on the CRS missions will be of
more value to the ISS Program. This cargo may include
high dollar value critical spares required to perform
crucial on-orbit repairs of the ISS. The CRS missions
will also be flying experiments, perhaps one-of-a kind,
to the ISS. The FAA and range are the ultimate
decision makers in the launch readiness for public
safety. However, NASA has retained its right to
remove their cargo from the commercial partner's
launch vehicle or to not allow the vehicle to perform
rendezvous and proximity operations with the ISS.
NASA reserves the right to perform technical
assessments of the launch and cargo vehicles. These
assessments will evaluate the commercial partner's
readiness to deliver NASA cargo safely to the ISS.
Insight into the orbital vehicle will largely be
accomplished by NASA's role in the ISS integration
activities, additional insight is gained throu gh vehicle
production insight for each CRS mission.
3.1 Insight vs. Oversight
The review and approval of the commercial partner's
hazard analysis, which addresses Integrated Operations
with ISS, by the ISS Program SRP is an oversight
function. From a safety and mission assurance
perspective, some traditional oversight functions are
Long before the COTS agreements or CRS contracts,
NASA had begun reducing and eliminating GMIPs on
other NASA contracts. The approach to transition
traditional government oversight to an insight
surveillance function placed the responsibility on the
NASA contractor to assure the quality of their own
products/vehicles. The new NASA paradigm also
involved other factors, but not limited to the review of
the contractor's quality management system and
audit-process surveillance type activities, in determining
the extent of GMIPs on a contractor [12].
To reduce the risk to the ISS Program from placing the
quality of the commercial partner's vehicle on the
partners themselves, the conunercial partners are
required to maintain a Quality Mana gement System that
is AS9100 compliant. NASA also reserves the right to
monitor NASA-selected audits with the partner's
auditors and inspectors in order to provide
understanding of the partner's quality system and
insight of their processes [7]. NASA will be assessing
the contractors' ability to "do" as they "say" as
documented within their QMS processes.
In addition, the partners are required to provide all
quality data necessary to support NASA insight, such
as ; but not limited to, Material Review Board (MRB)
reports, discrepancy reports, and deviations and
waivers. Assessment of this data will provide NASA
insight into areas where the partner may be accepting
more risk. There are many other "hooks" in the CRS
contracts to allow process audits/surveillance to gain
insight into the partner's readiness.
3.2 Teaming with NASA Kennedy Space Center
(KSC)
Independent assessments will be performed on both the
launch and orbital vehicle based on the data,
observations, and other sources of information available
to NASA. The ISS Program, recognizing that their area
of expertise lies more with the orbital vehicle as
applicable to integrated operations with the ISS, has
teamed with Kennedy Space Center to support the
independent assessments of the launch vehicle.
The NASA Launch Services Program (LSP) based at
Kennedy Space Center (KSC)^ is responsible for
managing the large majority of expendable launch
services acquired by NASA from connnercial launch
service providers for science and exploration. In this
capacity, NASA exercises technical insight and
approval for such launches, primarily from Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida (CCAFS) and
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California (VAFB).
In support of this responsibility LSP receives matrixed
support from the KSC Engineering Directorate (NE)
and the Safety & Mission Assurance Directorate's
Launch Services Division (SMA-LS). In some cases
ELV launches are managed by other organizations in
order to capitalize on special competencies. In these
situations it is normal for LSP to enter into agreements
to provide advisory support to the launch managing
proj ect.
LSP has entered into such an agreement with the ISS
Program. As part of this agreement, SMA-LS will
perform specific risk assessments related to launch
vehicle mission assurance issues. The ISS Program will
supply data to SMA-LS, such as mission V analysis
requirement excursions and violations, MRB "use as is"
and "repair" actions, launch vehicle
hardware/software/systems concerns, anomalies and
failures, and other data that may increase risk to the
launch vehicle.
Neither LSP nor SMA-LS has any NASA CoFR
responsibility for CRS missions. However, the risk
assessment data provided by SMA-LS will be used to
help the ISS Program determine the overall readiness of
the commercial partner to successfully delivery cargo to
the ISS in a timely and safe manner.
4 CONCLUSION
In assessing the risk to the NASA mission of the U.S.
privatization of cargo transportation capabilities to ISS,
NASA has identified areas of risk and developed either
an oversight or insight surveillance strategy to mitigate
the risk, based upon the severity of the risk.
ISS Integration activities will be completed and
approved by NASA prior to any of the demonstration
missions to ISS, as well as for CRS missions. These
activities focus to nutigate the risk to the ISS during the
commercial vehicle's integrated operations with the ISS
and ensure the safe integration of the COTS/CRS
vehicles with the ISS.
ISS Integration activities include the review and
approval of the commercial partner's hazard analyses,
addressing all integrated operations, by the ISS SRP.
The safety review process and analysis methods are
proven and mature and have been utilized with
International Partners.
NASA will utilize the existing CoFR processes to assess
the readiness of ISS to accept the COTS/CRS missions
and its cargo and return items and the ground
hardware/software support facilities and personnel to
support the flight, stage and increment. As NASA does
not participate in the final launch countdown, NASA
reserves the right to have its cargo removed from the
vehicle or wave off the vehicle from the approach to or
berthing to ISS. NASA will utilize its technical
assessments of the commercial partners' readiness to
deliver cargo safely to the ISS in snaking this decision.
In addition, NASA capitalizes upon their expertise at
both Johnson Space Center and Kennedy Space Center
to maximize the success of CRS missions to ISS.
NASA's oversight and insight strategy for commercial
resupply mission has allowed commercial space
providers to enter into a financially feasible market,
while maintaining a safe environment for the ISS and its
crew.
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Purpose
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• International Space Station
♦ A multi-nation collaborative effort
♦ Maintain a long term human
presence in space and creates an
outpost for experimentation in
microgravity
♦ Resupply essential to maintaining
ISS
♦ Logistics shortfall beyond Shuttle
retirement
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a	 Services (COTS)
• NASA helps industry develop and demonstrate cargo space transportation
capabilities
♦ Industry leads and directs its own efforts
♦ NASA providing technical and financial assistance
• 1St COTS competition completed in August 2006
• Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX)
• Rocketplane-Kistler (RpK)
• Failed to complete financial and technical milestones. Terminated
• 2nd COTS competition completed in February 2008
♦ Orbital Science Corporation
4
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Commercial Resupply Services (CRS)
• An end-to-end resupply service encompasses all work required to
integrate launch vehicle, orbital vehicle, and cargo to perform cargo
resupply missions to the ISS.
• On December 23, 20008, NASA awarded two CRS contracts
n SpaceX — twelve missions with pressurized, unpressurized, and return
capability
n Orbital — eight missions with pressurized and disposal capabilities
Dragon Spacecraft with Solar Arrays
Deployed Artist rendering of Cygnus spacecraftapproaching the International Space Station
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Dragon CRS Mission Capabilities
• Pressure Vessel Interior
(pressurized/recoverable)
♦ 10m 3 payload volume
♦ Typically middeck locker
accommodations
♦ Other mounting accommodations
available
• Trunk
(un press urized/unrecoverable)
• 14 m3 payload volume
• "FRAM" type pallet interface
mounted to a strong back
• Total Cargo Mass
♦ 6000 kg total combined up-mass
capability
♦ Up to 3000 kg down mass
6
2,000 kg (standard)
2,700 kg (enhanced)
X.
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Cygnus CRS Mission Capabilities
• Pressurized Volume
♦ 18.9 m 3 payload volume
♦ Total Cargo Mass:
• 8 Flights over period 2011-2015
• Standardized Active and Passive Cargo
Accommodations
• Passive Cargo: Cargo Transfer Bags (CTBs) M-
bags, Mid-Deck Lockers (MDL)
• Active Cargo: Two single MDL or one Double
MDL sized payloads
• Disposal cargo reloaded into Cygnus prior to
unberthing
Cygnus
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ISS Integration Requirements
• Provides interface and performance requirements between ISS and COTS
vehicle
•	 Provides performance and design requirements for the COTS ground
systems supporting COTS vehicle flights to ISS
• Provides design requirements on the COTS vehicle to ensure safe
integration with ISS
The critical interface for insight and approval is at the ISS interface.
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Scope of ISS Visiting Vehicle Requirements
Approach Ellipsoid (AE)	
Keep-out Sphere
(200m radius)
4km
V Bar
2km
Out of plane minor axis
of AE is 2km
R-Bar
Approach Ellipsoid and Keep-Out Sphere
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ISS Integration Requirements Summary
• ISS Cargo Accommodations
• ISS Crew Accommodations
• ISS Rendezvous and Proximity Operations
• Vestibule Pressurization/Depressurization
• Micro-gravity Requirements
• Command and Data Handling
• Communication, Command and Control
• EVA and Robotics
• On-Orbit Environmental Conditions
• Safety and Mission Assurance
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Safety Requirements and Process
• ISS Program safety requirements derived from Shuttle Safety Policy
and Requirements
♦ Utilizing a proven approach for control philosophy for catastrophic and critical
hazards, as well as for design for minimum risk approach
• ISS Integration safety requirements derived from ISS Program safety
requirements
• Any Visiting Vehicle to ISS:
• Must comply with phased ISS Program Safety Review Process
• Must adhere to ISS Safety Review Process
• Must Perform safety analyses in accordance with ISS Program safety analysis
and risk assessment requirements process
• The ISS Safety Review Panel will review and approve the hazard analysis, which
addresses all ISS-related mission phases.
• Integrated safety of the ISS is not compromised by commercial
ventures
11
M	 Certification of Flight Readiness (CoFR)
• Missions will be FAA licensed commercial launches.
♦ NASA does not have go/no-go authority for launch.
• The ISS Program will CoFR that the contractor has met the ISS
Integration requirements, that the ISS Program has met its stage
requirements, and that the contractor is meeting the contractual
requirements for vehicle readiness and capability.
• NASA GO/NO-GO Decision Points
12
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What is New Under CRS?
• NASA reserves the right to perform technical assessments of the
launch and cargo vehicles
♦ Evaluate readiness to deliver NASA cargo safely to the ISS
• Insight vs. Oversight
• Teaming with NASA Kennedy Space Center
13
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Conclusions
a
• Oversight or insight surveillance strategy determined based of
severity of risk
• ISS Integration activities completed and approved by NASA before
demonstration missions
• ISS Integration activities include safety review and approval of hazard
analysis addressing all integrated operations
• NASA will utilize its technical assessments of partner's readiness to
deliver cargo safely to the ISS in making decisions
14
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